Is it Worth it to Win the Talent War? Using Turnover Research to Evaluate the Utility of  Performance-Based Pay by Boudreau, John  W. et al.
Cornell University ILR School 
DigitalCommons@ILR 
CAHRS Working Paper Series Center for Advanced Human Resource Studies (CAHRS) 
March 1999 
Is it Worth it to Win the Talent War? Using Turnover Research to 
Evaluate the Utility of Performance-Based Pay 
John W. Boudreau 
Cornell University 
Michael C. Sturman 
Louisiana State University, mcs5@cornell.edu 
Charlie O. Trevor 
Pennsylvania State University 
Barry A. Gerhart 
Vanderbilt University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cahrswp 
Thank you for downloading an article from DigitalCommons@ILR. 
Support this valuable resource today! 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Center for Advanced Human Resource Studies 
(CAHRS) at DigitalCommons@ILR. It has been accepted for inclusion in CAHRS Working Paper Series by an 
authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@ILR. For more information, please contact catherwood-
dig@cornell.edu. 
If you have a disability and are having trouble accessing information on this website or need materials in an 
alternate format, contact web-accessibility@cornell.edu for assistance. 
Is it Worth it to Win the Talent War? Using Turnover Research to Evaluate the 
Utility of Performance-Based Pay 
Abstract 
Evidence from executive surveys and the business press suggests that while “winning the talent war,” the 
attraction and retention of key talent, is increasingly pivotal to organization success, it is an area of poor 
perceived performance. This paper shows how the Boudreau & Berger (1985) staffing utility framework 
can be used by industrial/organizational psychologists and other HR professionals to integrate turnover 
and compensation research to address this issue. Using published research based on a large 
petrochemical organization, we used this model to estimate the financial implications of how incentive 
pay programs affect the turnover patterns of employees of various performance levels. The 
demonstration highlights the importance of an integrated approach to employee selection, retention and 
compensation, and reveals the key role of performance variability in the decision to use incentive pay to 
enhance talent retention. Furthermore, our method should provide a structure for organizations to assess 
the profitability of company-specific performance-based pay policies. 
Keywords 
talent, organization, employee, compensation, HR, performance, retention, pay 
Comments 
Suggested Citation 
Boudrea, J. W., Sturman, M. C., Trevor, C. O. & Gerhart, B. (1999). Is it worth it to win the talent war? Using 
turnover research to evaluate the utility of performance-based pay (CAHRS Working Paper #99-06). 
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Center for Advanced Human 
Resource Studies. 
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cahrswp/105 
This article is available at DigitalCommons@ILR: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cahrswp/105 
  
 
   
 
 
W O R K I N G  P A P E R  S E R I E S  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Is it Worth it to Win the Talent War? 
Using Turnover Research to Evaluate the 
Utility of Performance-Based Pay 
 
John W. Boudreau 
Michael C. Sturman 
Charlie O. Trevor 
Barry Gerhart 
 
Working Paper 9 9 – 0 6 
 
 
CAHRS / Cornell University 
187 Ives Hall 
Ithaca, NY  14853-3901  USA 
Tel.  607 255-9358 
www.ilr.cornell.edu/depts/CAHRS/ 
 
Advancing the World of Work
 
 
Is it Worth it to Win the Talent War? WP 99-06 
 
Page 2 
 
 
Is it Worth it to Win the Talent War? Using 
Turnover Research to Evaluate the Utility of 
Performance-Based Pay 
 
 
 
John W. Boudreau 
Center for Advanced Human Resource Studies (CAHRS) 
Department of Human Resources Studies 
School of Industrial and Labor Relations 
Cornell University 
 
 
Michael C. Sturman 
Rucks Department of Management 
E. J. Ourso College of Business Administration 
Louisiana State University 
 
 
Charlie O. Trevor 
Department of Management & Organization 
Smeal College of Business Administration 
Pennsylvania State University 
 
 
Barry Gerhart 
Owen Graduate School of Business 
Vanderbilt University 
 
Working Paper 99-06 
 
 
 
http://www.ilr.cornell.edu/cahrs 
 
This paper has not undergone formal review or approval of the faculty of the ILR School.  It is 
intended to make results of Center research available to others interested in preliminary form to 
encourage discussion and suggestions. 
Is it Worth it to Win the Talent War? WP 99-06 
 
Page 3 
ABSTRACT 
 
Evidence from executive surveys and the business press suggests that while ”winning 
the talent war,” the attraction and retention of key talent, is increasingly pivotal to organization 
success, it is an area of poor perceived performance.   This paper shows how the Boudreau & 
Berger (1985) staffing utility framework can be used by industrial/organizational psychologists 
and other HR professionals to integrate turnover and compensation research to address this 
issue.  Using published research based on a large petrochemical organization, we used this 
model to estimate the financial implications of how incentive pay programs affect the turnover 
patterns of employees of various performance levels.  The demonstration highlights the 
importance of an integrated approach to employee selection, retention and compensation, and 
reveals the key role of performance variability in the decision to use incentive pay to enhance 
talent retention.  Furthermore, our method should provide a structure for organizations to assess 
the profitability of company-specific performance-based pay policies. 
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The Value of Performance-Based Pay in the War for Talent 
Recent research provides strong evidence that the relationship between employee 
performance and voluntary turnover is curvilinear, such that low and high performers exhibit 
greater turnover than average performers (Trevor, Gerhart, & Boudreau, 1997; Williams & 
Livingstone, 1994).  This finding provides support for theoretical positions and models advanced 
over a number of years (e.g., Jackofsky, 1984; March & Simon, 1958).  Research has also 
advanced the notion that an organization’s reward system is likely to be an important 
contingency in determining voluntary turnover (Dreher, 1982; Gerhart & Milkovich, 1992; 
Harrison, Virick, & William, 1996; Jackofsky, 1984; Porter & Lawler, 1968; Schwab, 1991; 
Steers & Mowday, 1981), a hypothesis also supported by the Trevor et al. (1997) study.  In fact, 
Trevor, et al. (1997) found that the performance/turnover curvilinear relationship differs by pay 
level.  The probabilities for high performer turnover were most sensitive to pay differences. 
Together, these findings suggest that compensation can enhance organizational through pay 
systems that promote the attraction and retention of top talent, and encourage the exit of poor 
performers (Boudreau, 1991; Boudreau & Berger, 1985).  
The professional literature in HR suggests this is a laudable goal, with many citing the 
increasing difficulty in obtaining and keeping top talent in tight labor markets (Branch, 1998; 
Chambers, 1998; Rich, 1999; Quinn, Anderson, & Finkelstein, 1996).  A recent report 
(McKinsey & Company, 1998) of interviews with over 5,000 executives and managers found: 
− 65% of company executives believed that they had insufficient talent in the ranks of their 
top 300 leaders 
− 78% of the executives also believed that line managers should be held accountable for 
the quality of their people and yet only 7% felt that this actually was happening in their 
organizations. 
− 81% felt that human resource professionals (HR) should partner with other leaders to 
build a stronger executive talent pool while only 27% thought that HR plays this role. 
− Only 10% strongly believed that their companies retain most of their high performers 
Identifying, attracting and retaining good talent, and providing measures that help managers 
understand and become accountable for good talent, are basic tenets of research. Yet, 
translating these research findings into concrete practical applications apparently remains a 
significant challenge for most organizations. 
This paper demonstrates a technique for such a translation.  The employee movement 
utility model of Boudreau & Berger (1985) provides the means to use the Trevor et al. (1997) 
results, and related turnover research describing how pay policy affects the nature of the 
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performance/turnover relationship, to evaluate the dollar value implications of various pay-for- 
performance strategies.  The application described here is meant to (a) demonstrate how 
research findings can be used to diagnose, inform and evaluate management decisions, (b) 
demonstrate the conditions under which this model provides information that would enhance 
decisions beyond traditional cost or accounting-based analysis, and (c) encourage and enable 
others to perform company-specific replications. 
Utility Analysis 
The Trevor et al. (1997) results suggest that pay policies that provide greater pay growth 
for high performers (and less for low performers) would retain more high performers, encourage 
separation among low performers, and thus increase the value of the work force.  In principle, 
this is an appealing prospect, but it is unclear whether organizational resources devoted to such 
rewards will  yield a value-added return.  Moreover, it is unclear to what extent the value would 
depend on factors such as the pay policy, the retention pattern, the variability in performance, or 
other factors. The utility framework provides a method to address these questions. 
Traditionally, utility analysis has been used to aggregate diverse effects into a common 
dollar-valued scale (Boudreau, 1991).  In order to estimate the dollar value implications of 
different performance-based pay systems, we adapted the Boudreau and Berger (1985) 
separation/ acquisition utility model.  This model captures the value associated with separations 
and acquisitions over time, differentially by performance level.  Specifically, this model estimates 
three components in each relevant time period: (1) the movement costs associated with 
separations and acquisitions; (2) the service costs (pay, benefits, and associated expenses) 
required to support the work force; and (3) the service value, or dollar value of the goods and 
services produced by the work force.  The dollar-valued implications of different separation and 
acquisition patterns over time are estimated by summing the stream of service value levels, and 
then subtracting the stream of service costs and movement costs.   
The Boudreau-Berger utility framework has recently been employed to examine the 
financial effects of different pay policies.  Klaas & McCledon (1996) examined the effects of 
changes in pay level, demonstrating that a policy of lagging the market would generate the 
highest utility, when applied to a sample of bank tellers using parameter estimates from both 
prior research and the particular situation.  These findings are intriguing, and demonstrate the 
value of applying the attraction-retention utility framework to compensation.  This is the only 
prior study to use utility analysis to empirically examine compensation policies, and it suggests 
that simply raising the pay level may not always be worth the cost.  Klaas and McCledon 
focused on the question of setting the pay level, which is a different decision from the pay-
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performance link, and a decision on which organizations may have less discretion to 
differentiate from each other (Gerhart & Milkovich, 1992).  Bank tellers were also found to be a 
job with a low value for performance variability (Klaas & McCledon, Table 2).  Thus, the Klaas & 
McCledon results are useful, and suggest the need to examine other elements of the 
compensation system, and the effects of differences in the value of performance variability. 
Table 1 presents a summary of the steps used in our application, and the Tables we 
employ to illustrate these steps. 
 
TABLE 1: Guide for Estimating the Financial Value 
 of Using Various Pay Strategies to Reduce High Performer Turnover 
 
Step Goal of Step Needed Information Source Relevant 
Tables 
1 Determine Pay Plans 
 
Data on specific pay policies, yielding 
the average expected pay at each 
performance level. 
Company-specific information,  
proposed pay plans, pay survey 
results, or research results. 
 
2 
2 Determine Turnover 
Probabilities 
A formula predicting the probability of 
turnover given a pay policy and 
performance level.  See Trevor, et al. 
(1997) for a detailed summary. 
Company-specific information, or 
research results 
 
2 
3 Determine Performance 
Distribution and Number 
of Separations 
Results of Steps 1 and 2   
2 
4 Determine Movement 
Transaction Costs 
Estimate of costs associated with 
separating and hiring new employees 
Company specific data, research 
results, or estimate (e.g., 1.5 
times average salary) 
 
2 
5 Determine Service Costs Costs associated with each 
individual’s employment:  salary, 
benefits, ongoing training etc. 
Company-specific information, 
pay survey results, or estimate 
(e.g., salary from Step 1, and 
benefits equal to 35% of salary) 
3 
 
6 Determine Service Value Individual service value at each 
performance level (reported in Table 
4) 
Total service value of the workforce in 
years of interest (Calculations 
illustrated in Tables 5, 6, 7, and 8) 
Company specific data, research 
results, or estimate. 
Calculations, are based on 
estimates of individual service 
value (Table 4) and number of 
separations and retentions (Table 
2) 
 
10 
7 Combine The 
Components into Overall 
Results 
Service Value (Table 9) minus 
Service Cost(Table 3) minus 
Movement Costs (Table 2) 
 10 
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We demonstrate this application on the results of the Trevor et al. (1997) study.  This 
study demonstrated the curvilinear relationship between performance and turnover, and also 
showed this relationship was modified by reward structure.  However, the methods we describe 
below should provide sufficient detail so that others can use the same method with their own 
data on turnover trends and/or potential pay plans, and incorporate new information from future 
studies linking pay, performance and mobility. 
Trevor et al. (1997) examined turnover patterns over a four-year period, so we applied 
the Boudreau and Berger (1985) model to a four-year period.  We modeled the investment 
decision as follows.  At the end of 1989, this organization chooses to implement pay strategies 
with varying linkages to performance.  Each potential strategy would change separation and 
retention patterns over the four years (1990 through 1993).  In 1993, after the four-year effects, 
the organization would possess a work force reflecting the performance distribution produced by 
the pay strategy.  Thus, by calculating the movement costs, service costs and service value 
between 1990 and 1993, and assuming that the intervening changes were linear, we can 
estimate the cumulative effects of a pay strategy over the four-year period.1 
The necessary calculations require a number of steps to specify the requisite data.  We 
use a statistical application and a number of spreadsheets to make the necessary calculations.  
The spreadsheets are available from the lead author upon request, but the following description 
should be sufficient for readers to create their own. 
Step 1:  Determine Pay Plans 
The first step in estimating the dollar-value effects of various pay policies with regard to 
their effects on turnover is to determine which pay policies are to be examined.  We chose three 
pay strategies to span a continuum from conservative to aggressive in linking pay to 
performance.  There is little empirical data on the distribution of specific pay-growth policies 
across pay levels, so to ground our estimates on realistic data, we constructed three 
hypothetical, but realistic, strategies constructed from the Trevor et al. (1997) sample’s actual 
mean and standard deviation of pay growth over the study period.  Those desiring to evaluate 
other pay plans would simply use the values appropriate to their decision situation.  Our results 
are likely to illustrate the general pattern, though particular applications may vary. 
In our hypothetical evaluation, Pay Strategy 1 gave  employees in all performance categories 
average pay increases (for their particular performance category) over the four-year period.  
Pay Strategy 2 gave average pay increases to most employees, but those in the three highest 
performance categories (performance ratings 4, 4.5, and 5) were given yearly increases equal 
to one standard deviation above the mean for their respective performance categories.  Pay 
Is it Worth it to Win the Talent War? WP 99-06 
 
Page 8 
Strategy 3 was similar to Pay Strategy 2, except that we added a low-pay component, in which 
those in the lowest two performance categories (performance ratings 1 and 1.5) were given 
yearly pay increases equal to one standard deviation below the mean for their particular 
performance category.  Hence, Pay Strategy 2, and particularly Pay Strategy 3, stress a 
relationship between pay and performance.  We then assessed the dollar-value implications 
related to each strategy's implementation.  The pay levels for each strategy for 1989 and 1993 
are shown in Table 2. 
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TABLE 2: Estimated Four Year Separation Patterns and Movement Costs Under Different Pay Strategies 
Performance Category 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0 Mean 
 
#Employees (1990) 48 78 946 881 1347 543 256 37 19  
 
1989 Average Pay $28,490 $29,473 $32,194 $37,437 $39,864 $43,561 $46,385 $41,041 $43,058 $38,187 
 
1993 Average Pay $30,124 $32,105 $37,882 $45,861 $48,404 $53,897 $57,677 $51,326 $54,462 $47,093 
(Strategy 1:  Weak pay/performance link) 
 
1993 Average Pay $30,124 $32,105 $37,882 $45,861 $48,404 $53,897 $64,393 $57,034 $62,982 $47,914 
(Strategy 2:  Moderate pay/performance link) 
 
1993 Average Pay $23,476 $26,529 $37,882 $45,861 $48,404 $53,897 $64,393 $57,034 $62,982 $47,957 
(Strategy 3:  Strong pay/performance link) 
 
Turnover Probabilitiess 
 Strategy 1 89% 37% 42% 19% 21% 16% 23% 20% 66% 
 Strategy 2 89% 37% 42% 19% 21% 16% 5% 2% 12% 
 Strategy 3 97% 42% 42% 19% 21% 16% 5% 2% 12% 
 
Retained Employees (1993)           Total 
 Strategy 1 5 49 549 714 1064 456 197 30 6 3070 
 Strategy 2 5 49 549 714 1064 456 243 36 17 3133 
 Strategy 3 1 33 549 714 1064 456 243 36 17 3113 
 
Replaced Employees (1990-1993)2 
 Strategy 1 43 29 397 167 283 87 59 7 13 1085 
 Strategy 2 43 29 397 167 283 87 13 1 2 1022 
 Strategy 3 47 45 397 167 283 87 13 1 2 1042 
 
Notes: 1. These values were based on analyses from the Trevor et al. (1997) study.  Those performing their own analyses would need to complete with table with 
their own company-specific data, or use approximations from the Trevor et al. results. 2. Recall that we are evaluating the effects of the different pay policies going 
into effect in 1990. Thus, while are data are based on the state of the workforce at the end of 1989, we are evaluating the effects of the programs in 1990-1993. 
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Step 2: Determine Turnover Probabilities 
Once the pay policies are determined, the next step involves determining the expected 
effects of each plan on turnover rates for each performance level.  Specifically, we wanted to 
model the following function:    
Probability of turnover = f (Pay Growth, Performance Level) 
By modeling this function, we can obtain an estimate for the probability of leaving the 
organization during the time period of interest in a way that reflects the effects of both 
performance and pay policy. 
Probabilities of turnover can be modeled in a number of ways.  At its simplest, one can 
calculate the average rate of turnover at a given performance level and a specific pay level.  
This is advantageous in its simplicity of calculation, but requires specified (and few) categories 
of both performance and salary growth.  With continuous salary growth and performance 
variables, turnover probabilities can also be modeled using logit or probit regressions.  This 
approach requires a statistical package, but allows estimating the expected probability of 
turnover at a set future time, for a specific performance and salary growth level.  This approach 
is also limited in that it does not differentiate between someone who separates after 1 day 
versus someone who leaves after 2 years.  Losing this information may make subsequent 
analyses inaccurate (Morita, Lee & Mowday, 1993).  A third approach is survival analysis 
(Kalbfleisch & Prentice, 1980).  This method computes the probability of individuals surviving 
(i.e., not leaving the organization) over the time span of interest, and takes into account the 
length of time an individual stays before leaving the organization.  Under certain circumstances, 
this approach can be more accurate than the previously described approaches (see Trevor et 
al., 1997), and is advantageous because the results can be used to model a variety of time 
frames (e.g., a one year analysis, four year analysis, etc.).  In sum, there are a number of ways 
to compute turnover probabilities.  We advocate the solution that is most practical to the 
circumstance, which of course depends on the availability of organizational data, availability of 
statistical packages, and the statistical sophistication of the individual performing the analyses. 
The Trevor et al. (1997) paper employed survival analysis and thus includes four-year 
survival probabilities of employees hired between the years 1983 and 1988.  Their analysis 
modeled survival as a function of demographic control variables, employee promotions, 
employee performance, salary growth, and the interaction of employee performance and salary 
growth.  The specific analysis and results are reported in Trevor et al. (1997), Tables 4 and 5 
(pg. 54 and pg. 55 respectively).  Results from this analysis allow us to determine the probability 
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of turnover (equal to [1 - the probability of survival]) for each performance category at the end of 
the four-year analysis period.  These are the probabilities shown in Table 2. 
Step 3:  Determine Performance Distribution and Number of Separations 
With the pay policies and the effects of the pay policies specified, it is necessary to have 
specific data on the number of people being affected.  We created a hypothetical 1989 cohort, 
based on the Trevor et al. (1997) data set, in order to track the effects of the three pay 
strategies over four years.  Our data contained information on employees hired between 1983 
and 1988 who were present at the beginning of 1989.  Thus, our analysis applies to a group of 
4,155 employees with six or less years of tenure with this firm (i.e., pre-1983 hires were not 
included in the data), representing 3,635 stayers and 520 employees that separated between 
1983 and 1989. 
The cohort's performance distribution, based on the actual distribution of employee 
performance levels in the Trevor et al. (1997) data set, is depicted in Table 2.  The number of 
individuals retained and the number of those who left (turned over) were determined by 
multiplying the number of individuals in each category by the probability of leaving.  These 
numbers are also reported in Table 2. 
Step 4:  Determine Movement Costs 
Costs of accommodating separations and replacements were assumed to be a linear 
function of the number of separations/replacements.  Because the number of separations is 
assumed to equal the number of replacements for this analysis, we combined separation and 
replacement costs and refer to them simply as "movement costs."  
An empirical estimate of movement costs for this particular organization was not 
available, so they were estimated to be 1.5 times the average salary of the work force in the 
year of the movement (a value recommended by Cascio, 1991, p. 19).  We also assumed that 
costs per employee movement would not vary with pay strategy, so we estimated average 
salary assuming average pay growth for all performance categories (Strategy 1). 
To make the necessary calculations, average salary level was calculated for 1989 and 
1993 based on the salary levels from Strategy 1.  Then, the movement costs for 1990 and 1993 
were calculated (as 1.5 times the average salary).  Finally, the overall average cost per 
movement was calculated assuming the rate that movement costs increased over time was 
linear, and thus equaled the average of the 1990 and 1993 movement costs.  These values are 
shown in Table 3.  The average movement cost was estimated to equal $65,629.  Total 
separation/acquisition costs for each pay strategy over the four-year period were calculated by 
multiplying the number of separations by this estimated movement cost.  As shown in Table 3, 
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total separation costs were $70.40 million, $66.32 million, and $67.61 million for Strategies 1, 2, 
and 3.  Thus, by reducing turnover among high-performers, the strategy of paying high 
performers more (Strategy 2) saves over $4 million in movement costs.  Paying high performers 
more and low performers less (Strategy 3) incurs additional movement costs as more low-
performers leave, but still represents a saving of almost $2.4 million over the four-year analysis 
period.  Some of these cost savings would be evident with standard accounting tools, to the 
extent that they represent “out of pocket” costs such as fees to search firms or consultants 
providing exit interviews.  However, many of these costs are “opportunity costs” such as the 
time of staff spent in processing separations and acquisitions.  Thus, it seems likely that only a 
portion of these cost savings would be recorded by the accounting system. 
 
TABLE 3: Estimated Four Year Movement Costs Under Different Pay Strategies 
  Strategy 1 Strategy 2 Strategy 3  
Average Salary  
 1989 $38,187 
 1993 $46,295 
Movement Costs 
 1989 $57,280 $57,280 $57,280 
 1993 $70,639 $70,639 $70,639 
Average Yearly Increase $3,041 $3041 $3,041 
 1990 $60,322 $60,322 $60,322 
Avg. (1990 & 1993) $64,883 $64,883 $64,883 
# Separations 1085 1022 1042 
Total Movement $70.40M $66.32M $67.61M 
Costs 
Notes: 
1. Movement costs were assumed to be unaffected by pay strategy, and thus were based on the average 
salary of the workforce under Strategy 1. 
2. Total Movement Costs were calculated assuming a linear growth in movement costs and an equal number 
of separations in each year.  Thus, Total Movement Costs could be calculated as the number of separations 
times the average 1990 & 1993 movement costs. 
 
Step 5:  Determine Service costs 
Service costs reflect the total ongoing costs required to retain and support the work 
force, such as pay and benefits (Boudreau & Berger, 1985).  Thus, service costs vary with pay 
strategies because base pay varies, as do pay-related expenses. Again, we assumed linear 
increases in service costs between 1989 and 1993 to estimate the total service costs incurred 
under each strategy during the four-year period. 
We calculated service costs as salary plus benefits, with benefit costs assumed to 
average 35% of salary (U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 1996).  This may underestimate total 
service costs, which would also include training costs and administrative costs supporting the 
employment relationship, but if these latter costs do not vary with pay strategies, comparisons 
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between pay strategies are unlikely to be substantively affected.  Service costs were calculated 
differently for those who were retained versus those replaced (Boudreau & Berger, 1985).  
Specifically, retained employees carried the effects of prior pay strategies, while the service 
costs of employees hired after 1989 was assumed equal to the average of the work force in the 
year they were hired.  For employees retained to the end of  the four-year analysis, we 
determined the 1993 salary level for each performance category at the end of the four-year 
period, under each pay strategy (see Table 2).  We multiplied this salary level by 1.35 to reflect 
total service costs, and then multiplied each service cost estimate in each performance category 
by the projected number of retained employees in each performance category under each pay 
strategy (see Table 4) to obtain the total 1993 service costs for retained employees in each 
performance category.  These were summed across performance categories to give an 
estimate of the total 1993 service costs for those retained from the 1989 work force.  As shown 
in Table 4, we divided the total by the number of retained employees to compute the average 
service cost of retained employees in 1993.  Then, we estimated the average employee service 
cost for the 1990-93 time frame as the average of the 1990 and 1993 per-employee service cost 
levels.  We multiplied this average by the number of retained employees in 1993 to determine 
the total service costs of retained employees for the four-year time frame. 
 
TABLE 4: Estimated Four Year Service Costs Under Different Pay Strategies 
  Strategy 1 Strategy 2 Strategy 3  
Average Salary 1989 $38,187 $38,187 $38,187 
 1993 $47,093 $47,914 $47,957 
Average Service Cost  1989 $51,552 $51,552 $51,552 
     (per employee) 1993 $63,575 $64,685 $64,742 
Average Yearly Increase  $3,006 $3,283 $3,298 
 1990 $54,558 $54,835 $54,850 
Avg.  (1990 & 1993) $59,066 $59,760 $59,796 
Number of Retained Employees 3070 3133 3113 
Total Service Cost of retained employees $725.33M $748.91M $744.58M  
Total Service Cost of replaced employees $256.35M $241.46M $246.19M 
Total Service Costs (1990-1993)  $981.68M $990.37M $990.77M 
Notes:  Total costs were calculated assuming a linear growth in service costs.  Thus, it was estimated to 
equal the number of employees times the number of years times the average service costs (1990 & 1993). 
 
To calculate 1993 service costs for the replacements, we assumed that under all pay 
strategies, replacements would have been of average quality, and paid the salary level that 
would have existed if average pay increases had been given over the four-year period (Strategy 
1).  This was calculated by multiplying the following--the number of replaced employees for 
each strategy,  by the average service cost associated with Strategy 1, by four--to represent the 
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four-year time frame.  The total service cost of the replaced employees is also shown on Table 
4, as is the total service costs for each pay strategy.  Note that this approach assumes that the 
average service costs of the applicant population equals the average service costs of the 
incumbent population, and does not vary with pay strategies.  We will discuss the potential 
effects of this assumption below. 
Table 4 suggests that the more aggressive the pay-for-performance strategy, the higher 
the service costs.  Strategy 3, which both raises the pay for high performers and lowers pay for 
low performers, costs about $9 million more over four years than Strategy 1 which gives 
average pay increases.  This increase is due to the greater pay for high performance, and the 
higher pay for the replacements of low performers, with those replacements assumed to be 
average performers receiving the average pay level.  It is notable that if standard accounting 
analysis were used, these costs would clearly become evident over time, as increases in payroll 
budgets, cost of goods sold, general and administrative expenses, etc.  Thus, considering that 
only a portion of the movement cost savings would appear in the ordinary accounting 
statements, and virtually all of the service cost increase would be evident, it is likely that 
standard accounting would project a four-year cost of between $5 million and $9 million.  In the 
absence of a clear alternative analysis, it seems likely that such significant accounting costs 
would result in a decision to forego performance-based pay systems.  Next, we demonstrate the 
key factors that can reveal such a decision to be a significant mistake.  
Step 6:  Determine service value 
Movement patterns also affect the quality or “service value” of the workforce.  Moreover, 
it has been shown that when performance variability is high, the effect of movement patterns on 
workforce value can be far greater than their effect on costs. (Boudreau & Berger, 1985; 
Boudreau, 1991).  To examine the potential effects of performance-based pay on workforce 
value, we need to estimate the dollar value of variability in the performance distribution and 
subsequent changes in the value of the work force. Our data provide estimates of changes in 
the performance rating distribution, so a conversion method is required to estimate the dollar 
value of particular performance levels.  This conversion method requires two components 
(Boudreau & Berger, 1985):  (a) the value of the average performance level, and (b) the 
incremental value of deviations from that average performance level.2 
We employed the Schmidt and Hunter (1983) approach, which assumes that the value 
of performance at each level would equal 1.754 times the average wage at that level.  For the 
1989 work force, we multiplied the average salary by 1.754 to obtain a value of $66,980 per 
person.  For the 1993 work force, consistent with the estimate of average service costs above, 
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we estimated average salary as that which would have been produced by four years of average 
salary increases, beginning in 1989.  Thus, as noted above, average 1993 salary was estimated 
to be $47,093 producing an average work force value estimate (1.754 times $47,093) of 
$82,600 per person. 
For the second component, we needed an estimate for the standard deviation of dollar-
valued performance (SDy) to calculate the value of each of the nine performance levels, in both 
1989 and 1993.  In this study, and probably typical of most organizations, we had no direct 
estimates of the dollar value of particular performance levels.  Hence, we used an estimation 
approach, based on SDy, the value of a one-standard-deviation difference in employee value, 
that does not require such estimates.  We investigated three values.  As an extremely 
conservative approach, we used 20% of average salary; we used 40% of average salary as a 
conservative estimate; and we used 100% of average salary as a more realistic estimate.3  In 
other words, for example, our three estimates suggest that an employee performing better than 
84 percent of the employee population  (one standard deviation above the mean) is worth 20% 
of salary, 40% of salary, or 100% of salary more to the organization than an average performer 
(i.e., someone performing at the 50th percentile). 
We estimated the Z-score corresponding to each of the nine performance ratings, using 
the observed distribution of employees across performance categories. The average 
performance rating was 2.74, with a standard deviation of .66. We assumed that the Z-scores 
for the underlying performance distribution would be the same from 1989 to 1993, because the 
underlying value function changes only with the job activities, which we assumed were constant.  
Thus, although the distribution of workers across performance categories changes from 1989 to 
1993, we assumed that the relative standardized value of different performance levels did not 
change.  This produced Z-scores corresponding to each performance rating, shown in the 
second row of Table 5.  
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TABLE 5: Computations for Estimating Individual Service Value at Each Performance Level 
 
Performance 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0  
 
Z(Performance) -2.64 -1.88 -1.14 -0.40 0.35 1.10 1.85 2.60 3.35 
 
Average Service Value 
 1989 $66,979 $66,979 $66,979 $66,979 $66,979 $66,979 $66,979 $66,979 $66,979 
 1993 $82,600 $82,600 $82,600 $82,600 $82,600 $82,600 $82,600 $82,600 $82,600 
Incremental Value (SDy = 20%) 
 1989 -$20,170 -$14,454 -$8,739 -$3,023 $2,692 $8,407 $14,123 $19,838 $25,554 
 1993 -$24,874 -$17,826 -$10,777 -$3,729 $3,320 $10,368 $17,417 $24,465 $31,514
  
Incremental Value (SDy = 40%)    
 1989 -$40,340 -$28,909 -$17,478 -$6,047 $5,384 $16,815 $28,246 $39,677 $51,108 
 1993 -$49,748 -$35,651 -$21,554 -$7,457 $6,640 $20,737 $34,833 $48,930 $63,027 
 
Incremental Value (SDy = 100%)         
 1989 -$100,850 -$72,272 -$43,695 -$15,117 $13,460 $42,037 $70,615 $99,192 $127,770 
 1993 -$124,370 -$89,128 -$53,885 -$18,643 $16,599 $51,841 $87,084 $122,326 $157,568 
 
Total Individual Value (SDy = 20%) 
 1989 $46,809 $52,525 $58,240 $63,956 $69,671 $75,387 $81,102 $86,818 $92,533 
 1993 $57,726 $64,775 $71,823 $78,872 $85,920 $92,969 $100,017 $107,066 $114,114
           
Total Individual Value (SDy = 40%)          
 1989 $26,639 $38,070 $49,501 $60,932 $72,363 $83,794 $95,225 $106,656 $118,087
 1993 $32,852 $46,949 $61,046 $75,143 $89,240 $103,337 $117,434 $131,531 $145,628
          
Total Individual Value (SDy = 100%)         
 1989 -$33,870 -$5,293 $23,284 $51,862 $80,439 $109,017 $137,594 $166,172 $194,749
 1993 -$41,770 -$6,527 $28,715 $63,957 $99,199 $134,442 $169,684 $204,926 $240,168
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For 1989, we estimated average salary as $38,187, producing SDy estimates of $7,637, 
$15,275 and $38,187 for the 20%, 40% and 100% levels, respectively.  For 1993, estimated 
average salary was $47,093, producing three corresponding estimated SDy levels of $9,419, 
$18,837, and $47,093.  Multiplying the Z-scores by the appropriate dollar value of a one 
standard deviation performance difference in 1989 and 1993 produced the “incremental” 
(beyond the average) dollar values corresponding to each performance rating level for each 
SDy assumption, shown in Table 5.  The sum of the average value for the workforce, plus the 
incremental value for each performance category, produced the total individual service values 
shown in Table 5. 
With total individual service values determined for both 1989 and 1993, it is possible to 
compute the total service value for the cohorts under each compensation method.  For 1989 (for 
all three methods), the total service value of the work force was calculated by multiplying the 
performance category service values by the corresponding quantities of employees in each 
performance category, and adding the products.  Table 6 shows the results of these analyses. 
 
 
Is it Worth it to Win the Talent War? WP 99-06 
 
Page 19 
 
 
TABLE 6: Computing Total Service Value for the Workforce in 1989 
 
 
Performance 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0 Total 
 
 
# Employees (1989) 48 78 946 881 1347 543 256 37 19 4,155 
 
1989 Total Service Value 
 
 SDy = 20% $2.25M $4.10M $55.10M $56.35M $93.85M $40.94M $20.76M $3.21M $1.76M $276.05M 
 
 SDy = 40% $1.28M $2.97M $46.83M $53.68M $97.47M $45.50M $24.38M $3.95M $2.24M $277.02M 
 
 SDy = 100% -$1.63M -$0.41M $22.03M $45.69M $108.35M $59.20M $35.22M $6.15M $3.70M $279.93M
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For 1993, the total service value of the work force was calculated separately for those 
employees retained over the four-year analysis, and for those hired during the four-year period, 
similarly to the service-cost calculation earlier.  For the retained employees, as shown in Table 
7, the 1993 service values for each SDy level were multiplied by the quantity of retained 
employees for each performance category, and these products were summed. 
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TABLE 7: Computing Total Service Value of Retained Employees, in 1993 
 
 
Performance 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0 Total 
 
 
Retained Employees (1993) [From Table 3] 
 Strategy 1 5 49 549 714 1064 456 197 30 6 3070 
 Strategy 2 5 49 549 714 1064 456 243 36 17 3133 
 Strategy 3 1 33 549 714 1064 456 243 36 17 3113 
 
1993 Total Service Value 
 
SDy = 20% 
 Strategy 1 $0.29M $3.17M $39.43M $56.31M $91.42M $42.39M $19.70M $3.21M $0.68M $256.62M 
 Strategy 2 $0.29M $3.17M $39.43M $56.31M $91.42M $42.39M $24.30M $3.85M $1.94M $263.12M 
 Strategy 3 $0.06M $2.14M $39.43M $56.31M $91.42M $42.39M $24.30M $3.85M $1.94M $261.85M 
           
SDy = 40%           
 Strategy 1 $0.16M $2.30M $33.51M $53.65M $94.95M $47.12M $23.13M $3.95M $0.87M $259.66M 
 Strategy 2 $0.16M $2.30M $33.51M $53.65M $94.95M $47.12M $28.54M $4.74M $2.48M $267.45M 
 Strategy 3 $0.03M $1.55M $33.51M $53.65M $94.95M $47.12M $28.54M $4.74M $2.48M $266.57M 
           
SDy = 100%           
 Strategy 1 -$0.21M -$0.32M $15.76M $45.67M $105.55M $61.31M $33.43M $6.15M $1.44M $268.77M 
 Strategy 2 -$0.21M -$0.32M $15.76M $45.67M $105.55M $61.31M $41.23M $7.38M $4.08M $280.45M 
 Strategy 3 -$0.04M -$0.22M $15.76M $45.67M $105.55M $61.31M $41.23M $7.38M $4.08M $280.72M 
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Those employees hired during the four-year analysis were assumed to have an average 
value equal to the average work force value that would have been produced by giving average 
pay increases over the four years ($82,600, see Table 5, which is 1.754 times the average 
salary of $47,093).  Thus, total service value of replaced employees was equal to the number of 
replacements times this average service value.  This value for each strategy is shown in Table 
8.  Note that the more aggressive pay policy produces a lower value for replaced employees, 
primarily due to the fact that it reduces separations, and thus the quantity of replaced 
employees is less. 
 
TABLE 8: Service Value of Replaced Employees 
  Strategy 1 Strategy 2 Strategy 3  
Average Service Value (1993) $82,600 $82,600 $82,600 
# Separations  1085 1022 1042 
Total Service Value  $89.62M $84.42M $86.07M 
Of Replacements (1993) 
 
 
We assigned the average incumbent service value (and the average incumbent service 
cost as discussed earlier) to new hires, which assumes that the applicant population has an 
average value and cost equal to the average job incumbent.  This seems reasonable over the 
long run, under steady-state conditions.  However, changing the pay system is not steady-state.  
Those attracted to organizations with strong pay-performance links may differ from those 
attracted by organizations having weaker links.  Gerhart and Milkovich (1992) suggested that 
pay not only affects behaviors of current employees, but also affects which applicants apply, 
accept offers and stay (workforce composition).  Cable and Judge (1994) found that several 
aspects of pay systems affected the attractiveness of organizations among college students.   
Their findings showed that a contingent (pay-for-performance) system was more attractive to 
risk takers, suggesting that pay systems can affect the applicant population.   This is consistent 
with Boudreau and Rynes (1985) who noted that attraction and retention must consider potential 
changes in the average value of applicant populations.   In sum, it seems possible that the 
average service value and cost of applicants may differ with different pay-for-performance 
systems.  If, as evidence suggests,  such applicants have a better “fit” (e.g., a more appropriate 
risk tolerance), then their service value may be higher, and their service costs (e.g., 
discipline/discharge, remedial training, etc.) may be lower.  This would make our estimates of 
the value of performance-based pay conservative.  On the other hand, should performance-
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based pay lower the average applicant value, or increase average applicant costs, our 
estimates would be inflated.  In view of the limited evidence on this issue, we chose to assume 
that average applicant service value and service costs do not vary with the pay system. 
 The service value of the replacements and retained employees was added to produce 
the estimated total 1993 service value for each pay strategy, and each assumed SDy level, as 
shown in Table 9.  As with service costs, we calculated the four-year stream of service value 
levels under each pay strategy and each assumed SDy level by assuming that total service 
value rose linearly between 1989 and 1993.  Calculations and results yielding the four-year total 
service value for each strategy and each SDy value are shown in Table 10.   
 
TABLE 9: Total Service Value of the 1993 Workforce 
   Value of   Value of  
  Retained EEs  Replaced EEs   Total 
 
SDy = 20%  
 Strategy 1 $256.62M + $89.62M = $346.24M 
 Strategy 2 $263.12M + $84.42M = $347.54M 
 Strategy 3 $261.85M + $86.07M = $347.92M 
 
SDy = 40% 
 Strategy 1 $259.66M + $89.62M = $349.28M 
 Strategy 2 $267.45M + $84.42M = $351.87M 
 Strategy 3 $266.57M + $86.07M = $352.64M 
 
SDy = 100% 
 Strategy 1 $268.77M + $89.62M = $358.39M 
 Strategy 2 $280.45M + $84.42M = $364.87M 
 Strategy 3 $280.72M + $86.07M = $366.79M 
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TABLE 10: Computing Four Year Total Service Value 
 
SDy=20% Strategy 1 Strategy 2 Strategy 3 
 1989 $276.05M $276.05M $276.05M 
 1993 $346.24M $347.54M $347.92M 
Average Yearly Increase $17.55M $17.87M $17.97M 
 1990 $293.60M $293.92M $294.02M 
 Avg. (1990 - 1993) $319.92M $320.73M $320.97M 
     
 Total Service Value $1,279.68M $1,282.92M $1,283.88M 
 (1990 - 1993) 
 
SDy=40% Strategy 1 Strategy 2 Strategy 3 
 1989 $277.02M $277.02M $277.02M 
 1993 $349.28M $351.87M $352.64M 
Average Yearly Increase $18.06M $18.71M $18.90M 
 1990 $295.09M $295.73M $295.93M 
 Avg. (1990 - 1993) $322.18M $323.80M $324.28M 
      
 Total Service Value $1,288.73M $1,295.20M $1,297.13M 
 (1990 - 1993) 
  
SDy=100% Strategy 1 Strategy 2 Strategy 3 
 1989 $279.93M $279.93M $279.93M 
 1993 $358.39M $364.87M $366.79M 
Average Yearly Increase $19.62M $21.24M $21.72M 
 1990 $299.54M $301.16M $301.64M 
 Avg. (1990 - 1993) $328.97M $333.01M $334.22M 
  
 Total Service Value $1,315.87M $1,332.05M $1,336.86M 
 (1990 - 1993) 
 
 
Under all assumptions about SDy, the 1993 yearly service value is lowest when giving 
all employees average pay increases (Strategy 1), higher when giving high performers high pay 
increases and all others average increases (Strategy 2), and highest when giving high 
performers high pay increases, middle performers average pay increases and low performers 
low pay increases (Strategy 3).  Compared  to Strategy 1, which gives all employees average 
pay increases, Strategy 2 causes more high-performing and highly-paid employees to stay, and 
their value enhances the work force.  Compared to Strategies 1 and 2, Strategy 3 augments this 
effect by encouraging low performers to leave, who are replaced with workers whose expected 
value is that of average workers. 
Step 7:  Combining The Components into Overall Results 
We have estimated the three components for this decision: (1) the four-year stream of 
movement costs, (2) the four-year stream of service costs, and (3) the four-year stream of 
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service value.  Now, we combine them to estimate the relative value of the three pay strategies, 
by taking the stream of service value and subtracting the stream of service costs and movement 
costs (Boudreau & Berger, 1985).  The relevant figures are summarized in Table 11, for each 
strategy and SDy assumption. 
 
TABLE 11: Computing of Four Year Investment Value of Different Pay Strategies 
        Four 
  Service - Service - Movement = Year 
  Value  Costs  Costs  Value 
  
SDy = 20%     
 Strategy 1 $1,279.68  - $981.68  - $71.21  = $226.79  
 Strategy 2 $1,282.92  - $990.37  - $67.07  = $225.47  
 Strategy 3 $1,283.88  - $990.77  - $68.39  = $224.73  
     
SDy = 40%     
 Strategy 1 $1,288.73  - $981.68  - $71.21  = $235.84  
 Strategy 2 $1,295.20  - $990.37  - $67.07  = $237.76  
 Strategy 3 $1,297.13  - $990.77  - $68.39  = $237.97  
     
SDy = 100%     
 Strategy 1 $1,315.87  - $981.68  - $71.21  = $262.98  
 Strategy 2 $1,332.05  - $990.37  - $67.07  = $274.61  
 Strategy 3 $1,336.86 - $990.77 - $68.39 =  $277.71 
 
These results suggest a different conclusion from the cost analysis presented earlier.  
Strategy 1, which appeared optimal based on costs, now appears optimal only if one assumes 
that performance differences are relatively low (SDy = 20% of average yearly salary).  If SDy is 
40% of average yearly salary or the more probable 100% of average salary, Strategy 3 
produces the greatest four-year value.  When SDy = 100%, the Strategy 3 advantage over 
Strategy 1 is potentially as high as $14.7 million.  Table 11 vividly shows the danger of relying 
simply on visible accounting costs.  As we have noted, it seems likely that the service costs 
(e.g., pay, benefits, training) would be most visible to the accounting system.  In this case, these 
costs produce the impression that Strategies 2 and 3 produce over 7 to 8 million dollars in 
additional costs for the four years.  Movement cost reductions offset this by approximately three 
to four million dollars, but such costs are less likely to be apparent in the accounting 
calculations.  Thus, it appears plausible that traditional compensation-cost analyses probably 
lead decision makers to the conclusion that performance-based pay systems will be extremely 
costly.  When the potential benefits of workforce value are estimated, however, it becomes clear 
that such investments carry the potential for significant organizational improvement.   
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In this case, the decision to forego the performance-based pay system is appropriate 
only if decision makers are relatively certain that performance differences (SDy) among these 
high-level employees amount to only 20% of average salary per year.  In other words, pay for 
performance schemes are less likely to be effective when the value of high performers is not 
much more than the value of average performers.  At higher SDy levels,  when performance 
differences are more pivotal, the risk of failing to implement performance-based pay can easily 
be  far greater than even a large apparent  cost. 
Conclusions, Limitations, and Further Research  
This analysis suggests that under realistic and moderately conservative assumptions 
about the value of performance variability (SDy) among employees, the four-year financial 
benefit of linking pay to performance in this organization was substantial. Continuing the prior 
policy of relatively non-differentiated pay levels seems to be appropriate only if decision makers 
believe that performance differences are relatively inconsequential (i.e., when SDy equaled 20% 
or less).  If individual performance is of little consequence, or if pay is linked to a performance 
measurement system that fails to capture individual value differences, the costs of implementing 
a performance-based compensation plan may well outstrip both the savings in turnover 
transaction costs and any workforce quality enhancements.  Under realistic assumptions of a 
positive relationship between performance ratings and value, and significant consequences of 
performance variability, the present model shows the potentially high payoff from investments in 
performance-based pay. 
Moreover, the analysis shown here vividly illustrates the limitations of standard 
accounting and cost-based approaches for identifying the critical variables, and the appropriate 
strategy.  The value of performance differences emerged as a pivotal factor in this decision, and 
this approach provides a tool to isolate this factor so that it can be analyzed in conjunction with 
the more apparent cost implications.  Boudreau and Ramstad (1997, 1999) have noted the 
importance of understanding the “moments of truth” that link employee actions to strategic 
success.  One manifestation of this link is the value of performance variability.  The technique 
described here is one way to make the link between human resources and strategic success 
more tangible and usable for both researchers and decision makers. 
Of course, these results reflect a particular set of organizational characteristics, such as 
pay plan specifics, the individual job performance distribution, and the relative value of 
differences in job performance ratings.  This is appropriate to the intent of this paper, which was 
to demonstrate how turnover and compensation research findings could be translated through 
the movement utility model, to evaluate the impact of HR interventions.  These particular results 
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may not generalize across all pay policies and organizations, and other organizations may have 
additional relevant cost and benefit factors.  For example, we may have understated the dollar 
value implications of pay for performance.  Rosenbaum (1979, 1984) and Forbes and Wertheim 
(1995) maintain that early career promotions predict later promotions and that those not 
promoted early tend to be eliminated from later competition. Thus, SDy  values would be higher 
if SDy encompasses future career progress, rather than simply current job performance. This 
would increase the consequences of performance variation and result in further advantage for 
the pay for performance strategies.  Essentially, the better-performing employees of today 
become the key leaders of tomorrow if they stay, or create significant leadership vacancies if 
they do not stay.  Additionally, our utility analysis assumed no change in performance levels of 
the “stock” of employees, focusing instead on the effects of the pay system on the “flow” of 
employees into and out of the workforce.  Yet, paying for performance may motivate employees 
to perform better.  Such effects could increase the average level of performance for those who 
do not leave, which would also enhance the payoff for performance-based pay.   
On the other hand, there may be additional training costs or administrative costs 
associated with the various policies, which we did not include.  We believe such costs could 
easily be incorporated into this framework, and that the framework provides useful guidance on 
the role of costs in the performance-based pay decision.   The method we describe involves a 
significant amount of calculation, but is relatively simple to replicate on a spreadsheet.  Actual 
replication may require some customization to fit a specific company’s profile, but the basic 
premise of the methods should be the same. 
We hope that this demonstration will inspire organizations to more fully tap  available 
research findings to help them enhance decisions about their HR policies.  Organizations of all 
types will apparently face increasing pressures to “win the talent war” by employing all available 
tools to enhance attraction, selection and retention processes.  A formidable tool in this 
endeavor is the accumulated knowledge available from industrial/organizational psychology and 
human resources research.  The method described here shows how utility analysis can be used 
to demystify and integrate this research, making it a more practical decision-making tool, and 
thus a more potent influence on significant strategic organizational goals (Boudreau, 1991; 
Boudreau & Ramstad, 1999; Boudreau & Ramstad, 1997). 
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Footnotes 
                                                 
1
 The Boudreau and Berger (1985) model in its purest form would calculate the work force value 
in each intervening year and apply a discount factor to equalize the time value of the dollar 
amounts.  However, such embellishments would not have a significant effect in this case 
because the changes in dollar amounts are assumed to be linear, the time frame is relatively 
short, and our focus is on the relative (versus absolute) value of the different strategies. We also 
did not have information about the organizational tax rate, so we report our results in pre-tax 
dollars. After-tax effects could be easily calculated by multiplying the final results by an 
appropriate after-tax proportion, but the relative effects of the options would not be altered. 
 
2
 There is no single accepted method of estimating the dollar value of average performance 
among workers or applicants.  Some research has suggested that average performance value 
can be estimated equal to the average compensation of the work group (Boudreau, 1991, p. 
654; Raju, Burke & Normand, 1990, p. 9).  However, it seems unlikely that average-performing 
employees produce only enough value to offset their direct wage costs.  Considering the other 
service costs that are incurred, and the need for organizations to obtain a positive return on 
costs, a higher level of average service value seems likely.  Based on an analysis of wage and 
productivity estimates in the national income accounts of the United States, Schmidt and Hunter 
(1983) proposed assuming that the ratio of average dollar value to average wage is 
approximately 1.754. 
 
3
 Support of the 100% approach is provided by Becker and Huselid (1992), who found direct 
observations of SDy fell in the 74% to 100% of mean salary range. 
